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NATO and the enlargement debate: enhancing Euro-Atlantic security or inciting 
confrontation? 
TRACEY GERMAN 
With Russia taking an increasingly assertive stance on the global stage,1 and uncertainty 
surrounding the direction of US foreign policy under the presidency of Donald Trump, the 
issue of NATO enlargement is unlikely to be a priority for the alliance over the next few 
years. Trump has declared that, in his opinion, NATO is obsolete, and has expressed his 
desire for a renewed partnership with Moscow.2 Moscow has consistently voiced its 
opposition to NATO’s global reach and enlargement, particularly within what it considers 
Russia’s ‘zone of privileged interest’.3 This is bad news for Georgia and Ukraine, which are 
likely to see their bids for membership of the Euro-Atlantic alliance ‘parked’, and raises the 
question of what is to become of those states within the post-Soviet space that have so far 
failed to join NATO.4 
NATO’s deepening engagement with countries to the east, once former adversaries, and its 
continued enlargement are the most obvious aspects of the alliance’s post-Cold War 
transformation, and among the most controversial. Since its establishment in 1949, it has 
                                                          
1 David S. Yost, ‘The Budapest memorandum and Russia’s intervention in Ukraine’, 
International Affairs 91: 3, May 2015, pp. 505–38.  
2 There is considerable uncertainty about what direction the Trump administration will take in 
terms of foreign policy: the new President’s views of NATO contrast with those of some of 
his team. 
3 In the aftermath of the 2008 war with Georgia, President Dmitry Medvedev identified five 
principles of Russian foreign policy, including the notion that there are areas where Russia 
has ‘privileged interests’ as a result of ‘special historical relations’. He stated that these 
regions are home to countries which are bound together with Russia ‘as friends and good 
neighbours. We will pay particular attention to our work in these regions and build friendly 
ties with these countries, our close neighbours.’ While he did not name any specific area, he 
is thought to have been referring to the post-Soviet space. Dmitry Medvedev, interview with 
Russian TV Channel One, Rossiya, NTV, 31 Aug. 2008, 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/48301. (Unless otherwise noted at point of 
citation, all URLs cited in this article were accessible on 22 Jan. 2017.) 
4 Andrew T. Wolff, ‘The future of NATO enlargement after the Ukraine crisis’, International 
Affairs 91: 5, Sept. 2015, pp. 1103–22. 
more than doubled its membership from 12 to 28 states, and the majority of the new entrants 
have joined since the end of the Cold War. The accession of Montenegro, expected to be 
completed in 2017, will take the total membership to 29. These enlargements have, to some 
extent, undermined NATO’s stated objectives in incorporating new members, and have 
exposed tensions within the alliance over deterrence and dialogue, the twin pillars of the 1967 
Harmel Report on ‘the future security policy of the alliance’. These outcomes are the direct 
result of the enlargements of the post-Cold War era being motivated by political, rather 
than—as the enlargements of 1952 and 1955 had been—military considerations. Enlargement 
has become a symbolic act rather than one of defensive necessity, as the recent incorporation 
of members from the Balkans demonstrates. Montenegro’s accession, which has little 
strategic importance, is a vital demonstration of the alliance’s continuing commitment to its 
promises regarding its ‘open door’ policy, indicating the primacy of the political, rather than 
military, aspects of enlargement. 
Despite there being many differences between the post-Soviet states currently seeking 
membership of NATO and the Balkan states that are pursuing accession, some of their 
motivations are similar: chiefly, the desire to move away from the past and diminish the 
influence of a powerful regional hegemon, which was also the centre of power during 
communist rule.5 Nevertheless, Montenegro is likely to be the last new member state for 
some time to come, alliance consensus regarding further expansion proving elusive in the 
face of a combination of ‘enlargement fatigue’ among western allies (many of which are 
focused on internal challenges), concern about the apparent threat from Moscow and a lack of 
non-contentious candidate states.6 
The post-Cold War policy of enlargement has brought the alliance into competition, and in 
some cases direct confrontation, with Moscow: the very opposite effect to that intended. 
NATO’s own 1995 study on the topic maintained that enlargement was only one ‘element of 
a broad European security architecture that transcends and renders obsolete the idea of 
“dividing lines” in Europe’.7 The 1995 study went on to stress the alliance’s conviction that 
                                                          
5 Tracey German, ‘Heading west? Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic path’, International Affairs 91: 3, 
May 2015, pp. 601–14. 
6 Once Montenegro joins, Serbia, which has retained close links with Russia, will be the only 
Balkan state remaining outside the alliance. 
7 Study on NATO enlargement, 3 Sept. 1995, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_24733.htm. 
there could be ‘no question of “spheres of influence” in contemporary Europe’. NATO’s 
approach to the question of enlargement has not only undermined Euro-Atlantic security and 
triggered new divisions between East and West, it has also exposed aspirant states, 
particularly those in the post-Soviet space, to sustained pressure and coercion. 
It is worth noting that the issue of possible future enlargement was not dealt with at all in the 
1967 Harmel Report, despite the fact that the alliance had accepted new members in 1952 
(Greece and Turkey) and 1955 (West Germany). Among the key themes of the report was the 
USSR’s place in the European security order and NATO’s quest to define a political role for 
itself, rather than a purely military one focused on collective defence: a state of affairs that 
resonates today. While there are similarities between the challenges facing the alliance in 
1967 and the contemporary strategic environment, not least the disparity between the power 
of the United States and that of the European pillar, as well as the ongoing debate about 
Russia’s role in the European security order, the report’s key concern was the perceived 
continuing expansion of Soviet influence around the world, particularly in Asia and the 
Middle East. This stands in stark contrast with the situation today. Now it is Russia that has 
expressed its grave concerns about the perceived continuing expansion of NATO’s influence 
(and that of the West more generally) around the world, and more particularly within its 
‘zone of privileged interest’. In the context of the Soviet challenge, the Harmel Report stated 
that the security of member states rested upon two pillars: 
<ext>[First,] the maintenance of adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter 
aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of the NATO countries if 
aggression should occur. Second, realistic measures to reduce tensions and the risk of 
conflict, including arms control and disarmament measures.8<extend> 
While the tables have been turned in the twenty-first century, Harmel’s twin pillars of 
deterrence and dialogue remain central to Euro-Atlantic security, particularly for the 
alliance’s newer members. This was underlined by the focus of the 2016 NATO summit in 
Warsaw on the continuing threat to Euro-Atlantic security from Russia, leading to an 
emphasis on deterrence and a strengthening of the alliance’s defence posture.9 However, 
                                                          
8 The future security policy of the alliance, report of rapporteur subgroup 3, Mr Foy D. 
Kahler, United States, 6 Oct. 1967, p. 1.{?} 
9 Warsaw summit communiqué issued by the heads of state and government participating in 
the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 8–9 July 2016, press release (2016) 
100, 9 July 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm. 
against a backdrop of continuing tensions between NATO and Russia, and futile attempts at 
dialogue, the deterrence pillar appears to be by far the more resilient of the two. 
This article explores the controversial issue of NATO enlargement, which has exposed 
tensions within the alliance with regard to the twin pillars of the Harmel report. The political 
(dialogue), rather than military (deterrence), aspect of the alliance has always been the more 
controversial, particularly when connected to the question of enlargement. The article 
examines the rationale for enlargement, focusing on the two post-Soviet aspirant states, 
Georgia and Ukraine, both of which lie within Moscow’s self-proclaimed ‘zone of privileged 
interest’ and are thus the most contentious. It demonstrates the basic friction between the 
motivations of those who have sought to join NATO since the end of the Cold War and the 
alliance’s declared logic for enlarging, most notably its desire to expand the ‘zone of peace 
and stability’ that surrounds it. This article argues that, in the light of the fundamental tension 
between its current ‘open door’ policy and Moscow’s desire to preserve its ‘zone of 
privileged interest’, NATO needs to revisit the purpose of enlargement and the balance 
between the two core pillars of the Harmel Report. Only then can it address fundamental 
questions of why (and if) it should continue to enlarge. 
The article considers whether, in view of the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, the alliance 
can continue to ensure the security of its member states while simultaneously developing 
partnerships with states within the post-Soviet space. It argues that NATO’s stance on 
enlargement in the post-Cold War era has not only undermined Euro-Atlantic security and 
triggered new divisions between East and West, but has also exposed aspirant states, 
particularly those in the post-Soviet space, to sustained pressure and indeed coercion from 
Moscow. Enhanced cooperation and partnership with these states, combined with vague 
promises about membership at ‘some point in the future’, ultimately undermine the alliance’s 
objective of fostering stability on its periphery. Furthermore, while these states continue to 
make an important contribution to the alliance’s efforts to advance cooperative security (for 
example, by deploying troops on NATO operations and missions), ultimately the issue of 
their prospective membership threatens to undermine alliance security and cohesion. Because 
decisions on enlargement are made on the basis of consensus, the question of potential 
membership for post-Soviet states risks undermining alliance cohesion and unity. Thus, the 
alliance’s open door policy appears to be detrimental to its own security and to that of 
aspirant states, a state of affairs that runs counter to the original objectives of enlargement 
and signals an inherent tension between Article 5 (collective defence) and Article 10 (the 
‘open door’ policy) of NATO’s Washington Treaty. 
In setting out this analysis, the article has been divided into four parts. First, it revisits the 
debates on enlargement of the 1990s and examines whether any progress has been made with 
regard to the specific controversies of that era. It explores the principal arguments put 
forward for enlargement in the post-Cold War era and argues that NATO failed to 
demonstrate a comprehensive understanding of the possible negative consequences of 
enlargement for European security. Second, it examines NATO’s enlargement into the post-
Soviet space. Third, it analyses the Russian response to the alliance’s enlargement and 
demonstrates that Russia’s military intervention in Georgia in 2008 revealed NATO’s limits 
of influence within Russia’s ‘zone of privileged interest’, as well as its lack of internal unity 
vis-à-vis relations with Moscow and future engagement with the area. Finally, it draws some 
conclusions about the future direction of enlargement in the post-Soviet space.  
Intentions and objectives of enlargement 
The debates of the 1990s on enlargement are of enduring relevance, despite one scholar’s 
insistence in 1999 that ‘everything has been said’ about enlargement and that there was little 
more to explore—a statement that draws attention to the sense of enlargement ‘fatigue’ that 
had developed by the end of the decade.10 There was considerable scholarly debate on the 
issues surrounding NATO enlargement in the mid-1990s and then again prior to the 2004 
round.11 Much of the analysis regarding the potential enlargement of NATO in the immediate 
post-Cold War years centred on the risk of prompting a new East–West confrontation. Gaddis 
described the enlargement project as ‘ill-conceived, ill-timed and . . . ill-suited to the realities 
of the post-Cold War world’, comparing it to events in 1918–19 in its intention to expand a 
‘security structure left over from a conflict that has now ended, while excluding the former 
                                                          
10 David G. Haglund, ‘NATO’s expansion and European security after the Washington 
summit—what next?’ European Security 8: 1, Spring 1999, p. 1. 
11 In addition to the publications cited in subsequent footnotes 12, 13, 15, 18, 19 & 20, see 
David G. Haglund, ed., Will NATO go east? The debate over enlarging the Atlantic Alliance 
(Kingston, Ont.: Centre for International Relations, 1996); Gerald B. Solomon, The NATO 
enlargement debate, 1990–1997: blessings of liberty (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998); 
Yaroslav Bilinsky, Endgame in NATO’s enlargement: the Baltic states and Ukraine 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999); Gale A. Mattox and Arthur R. Rachwald, eds, Enlarging 
NATO: the national debates (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001); Zoltan Barany, The future 
of NATO expansion: four case studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Very 
little has been written since the 2004 wave of enlargement.  
adversary from it’.12 He criticized the alliance for its short-sightedness, particularly vis-à-vis 
Russia, and the belief, seemingly prevalent in the 1990s, that Russia had no choice but to 
accept what NATO decided. Brown also denounced the ‘flawed logic of NATO expansion’, 
noting that enlargement could well prompt Moscow to adopt policies that would diminish, 
rather than enhance, European and US security—which is exactly was has transpired.13 He 
went on to assert that regardless of how NATO ‘packaged’ the issue of enlargement, it would 
still be perceived in Moscow as a change in the balance of power and an extension of 
Washington’s sphere of influence.14  
In a 1995 article examining the prospects for enlargement, Asmus, Kugler and Larrabee 
warned that much depended on how the process was handled and contended that ‘expansion 
could stabilise a new European security order or contribute to either the unravelling of the 
Alliance or a new Cold War with Russia . . . Failure could be disastrous, both for the 
Alliance’s future and for European stability.’15 In 1999 Haglund examined the perceived 
motives for enlargement and argued that, unlike the enlargements of 1952 and 1955, which 
were driven by a desire to contain and deter a Great Power adversary, post-Cold War 
enlargement was stimulated more by a determination to expand the European and 
transatlantic ‘zone of peace’, mentioned above.16 He also maintained that enlargement of the 
alliance would yield some benefits, but cautioned that these would be ‘modest’.17 Rauchhaus 
reasoned that in order to understand NATO’s motivations for enlargement, it was vital to 
understand why the United States wanted it to enlarge.18 Terriff and colleagues warned of the 
problems of enlarging ‘by default’ and urged the alliance to ‘consider how to manage the 
enlargement of its membership . . . , lest the process engender serious repercussions for the 
                                                          
12 John Lewis Gaddis, ‘History, grand strategy and NATO enlargement’, Survival 40:, Spring 
1998, pp. 145–46. 
13 Michael E. Brown, ‘The flawed logic of NATO expansion’, Survival 37: 1, Spring 1995, p. 
40. 
14 Brown, ‘The flawed logic of NATO expansion’, p. 43. 
15 Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler and F. Stephen Larrabee, ‘NATO expansion: the next 
steps’, Survival 37: 1, Spring 1995, pp. 7–8. 
16 Haglund, ‘NATO’s expansion and European security after the Washington summit’, p. 6. 
17 Haglund, ‘NATO’s expansion and European security after the Washington summit’, p. 6. 
18 Robert W. Rauchhaus, ‘Explaining NATO enlargement’, Contemporary Security Policy 
21: 2, 2000, p. 176. 
alliance and for European security’.19 Their analysis reflected the position of Kamp who, in 
1998, argued that without a clear framework for enlargement, NATO would become 
‘entrapped’ in a continual series of incoherent enlargements. He was very critical of the ‘open 
door’ policy which, in his opinion, left NATO ‘trapped’ and failed to answer crucial 
questions about relations with Russia and the fundamental purpose of the alliance.20 These 
debates are echoed today both in the discussion about any possible future enlargement of the 
alliance and in assessments of the consequences of the 1999 and 2004 waves. 
Article 10 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty articulates the alliance’s so-called open door 
policy, declaring that: ‘The parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European 
State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of 
the North Atlantic area to accede.’21 The communiqué from NATO’s 2016 Warsaw Summit 
reiterates the alliance’s commitment to this policy, which it describes as one of its great 
successes: 
<ext>We remain fully committed to the integration of those countries that aspire to join the 
Alliance, judging each on its own merits. We encourage those partners who aspire to join the 
Alliance—Georgia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina—to continue to implement the necessary reforms and decisions to prepare for 
membership.22<extend> 
Stressing that decisions on enlargement are for NATO itself, the declaration, repeating a line 
heard often since 2008, argues that: ‘Successive rounds of NATO enlargement have 
enhanced the security and stability of the entire Euro-Atlantic area’, an assertion that is 
debatable when considered within the context of current tensions between Russia and the 
West.23 The declaration (and those from previous summits) highlights ongoing tensions 
within the alliance between upholding its autonomy in decision-making and maintaining a 
positive relationship with Moscow. NATO’s decision not to grant Georgia a Membership 
                                                          
19 T. Terriff, S. Croft, E. Krahmann, M. Webber and J. Howorth, ‘One in, all in? NATO’s 
next enlargement’, International Affairs 78: 4, October 2002, p. 714. 
20 Karl-Heinz Kamp, ‘NATO entrapped: debating the next enlargement round’, Survival 40: 
3, Autumn 1998, p. 173. 
21 The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington DC, 4 April 1949, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm. 
22 Warsaw summit communiqué. 
23 Warsaw summit communiqué. 
Action Plan (MAP) at the 2014 Newport summit confirmed that alliance relations with 
Russia remained the priority, a decision that threatened to undermine reformers in Georgia 
and across the wider region, while simultaneously encouraging Moscow to continue a 
strategy of coercion towards its neighbours. The decision has not led to any improvement in 
NATO–Russia relations; in fact, by 2016 the situation had deteriorated sufficiently for NATO 
to augment its deterrence and defence posture, establishing an enhanced forward presence in 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, all member states that joined the alliance in the post-
Cold War era .24 This underlines NATO’s failure to grasp the depth of Russian concern 
regarding enlargement and the growing political role of the alliance.25 One scholar argued in 
2002 that the potential accession of the three Baltic states would symbolize a ‘true end to the 
Cold War;26 in fact, with the benefit of hindsight, it could be argued that the accession of 
these three former Soviet states merely emphasized the alliance’s lack of understanding of 
Moscow’s hardening attitude towards NATO and its growing sense of exclusion. 
NATO’s 1995 study on enlargement stated that the overall purpose of enlarging the alliance 
was to build an improved security architecture across the whole Euro-Atlantic area ‘to 
provide increased stability and security for all . . . without recreating dividing lines’.27 
Unfortunately, this intention has been fundamentally undermined by the process and 
consequences of enlargement, which have contributed to instability, conflict and a return to 
Cold War era dividing lines across Europe and the wider transatlantic area. As discussed 
below, the enlargement of NATO has fostered a belief in Russia that it is being excluded 
from the European security order. Although the report stressed that the enlargement process, 
including associated military arrangements, would threaten no one and was intended to 
enhance security and stability throughout Europe, the reality has been very different: Russia 
has consistently stated its opposition to any enlargement of the alliance, arguing that NATO 
is a relic of the Cold War, and perceives it as a threat to Russian national interests.28 The 
study paid significant attention to the issue of Russia and NATO–Russia relations, devoting 
                                                          
24 Warsaw summit communiqué. 
25 Richard Sakwa, ‘The death of Europe? Continental fates after Ukraine’, International 
Affairs 91: 3, May 2015, pp. 553–80. 
26 Mark Kramer, ‘NATO, the Baltic states and Russia: a framework for sustainable 
enlargement’, International Affairs 78: 4, Oct. 2002, p. 753. 
27 Study on NATO enlargement. 
28 Sakwa, ‘The death of Europe?’. 
an entire section to the topic. This recognizes both the importance of Russia itself and the 
influence it is able to exert over a wide area. Thus it stated that NATO decisions ‘cannot be 
subject to any veto or droit de regard by a non-member state’, implicitly recognizing 
Russia’s potential to act as a spoiler. The study also noted the anticipated potential impact of 
enlargement would have on the Euro-Atlantic security environment: 
<ext>The Alliance should underline that there can be no question of ‘spheres of influence’ in 
the contemporary Europe. NATO’s relations with other European states, whether cooperation 
partners or not, are important factors to consider in taking any decision to proceed with the 
enlargement process as is building security for states which may not be prospective NATO 
members. Any such decision will have a significant impact on the European security 
environment and its timing, therefore, will require careful consideration.29<extend> 
NATO has continued to stress that its ongoing enlargement process poses no threat to any 
country; that it is intended to promote stability and cooperation, and to build a Europe ‘whole 
and free, united in peace, democracy and common values’. The intention was the creation of 
a European security community in which war and the threat of war between member states 
disappeared, a community where security was not defined exclusively as the protection of 
national borders from military threat, but was achieved through benefits accrued from 
participating in ‘zones of peace, prosperity and stability’ and a vision of a common future.30 
                                                          
29 Study on NATO enlargement. 
30 In defining the concept of a ‘security community’, Karl Deutsch and others emphasized 
that such a community is created when social problems are resolved without resort to large-
scale physical force. See K. W. Deutsch, Political community and the North Atlantic area: 
international organisation in the light of historical experience (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1957). Deutsch and others concluded that while twelve conditions appeared 
to be essential for the success of an amalgamated security community, the pluralistic version 
required only three. Any additional conditions might enhance the chances of successful 
integration and consolidation; however, they were not considered indispensable. These 
essential conditions were: (1) the compatibility of major values relevant to political decision-
making; (2) the capacity of the participating political units or governments to respond to each 
other’s needs, messages and actions quickly, adequately and without resort to violence; and 
(3) mutual predictability of behaviour. Javier Solana expressed his belief that NATO is a 
security community in ‘NATO: a reliable alliance for dynamism and leadership’, NATO’s 
Sixteen Nations 42: 1, 1997, pp. 7–10.  
A key condition for the establishment of a security community, as defined by Deutsch, is the 
existence of shared values.31 This was emphasized in the 1995 study on enlargement, which 
defined the alliance as an ‘existing community of values’ and stressed that one of the ways in 
which enlargement would contribute to enhanced stability and security across the Euro-
Atlantic area was by ‘encouraging and supporting democratic reforms’.32 The study went on 
to outline a range of criteria for future members, including adherence to democratic 
principles, as well as the resolution of territorial disputes by peaceful means, stating that the 
‘resolution of such disputes would be a factor in determining whether to invite a state to 
join’.33 
Unfortunately, the 1995 study failed to address fundamental questions such as why the 
alliance should continue to enlarge. Nor did it demonstrate a comprehensive understanding of 
the possible negative consequences of enlargement for European security. The alliance has 
consistently overlooked (or disregarded) the declared position of the Russian leadership vis-
à-vis further enlargement.34 There seems to have been a belief among European policy-
makers that enlargement of western institutions such as NATO and the EU was solely a 
matter for the states concerned—either existing member states or those seeking 
membership—and that it stood apart from the broader European security agenda. The error of 
this conviction has become increasingly clear. It has been suggested that membership of an 
alliance is chosen by an adversary, as alliances are traditionally formed ‘against’ another 
actor within the international system.35 This is certainly the view that Moscow holds of 
NATO and those member states that have joined (or sought to join) after 1991: that they are 
joining ‘against’ Russia. The sense of exclusion has been intensified by NATO’s view of 
                                                          
31 Deutsch, Political community and the North Atlantic area. 
32 Study on NATO enlargement. 
33 Study on NATO enlargement. 
34 Sakwa, ‘The death of Europe?’. 
35 For further details on the theory of alliances and alliance formation, see Stephen M. Walt, 
The origins of alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); Glenn H. Snyder, 
Alliance politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO 
divided, NATO united: the evolution of an alliance (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004); Todd 
Sandler, ‘Alliance formation, alliance expansion, and the core’, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 43: 6, 1999, pp. 727–47; Glenn H. Snyder, ‘The security dilemma in alliance 
politics’, World Politics 36: 4, 1984, pp. 461–95. 
itself as a as a political community of democratic values and institutions, emphasized by the 
2016 Warsaw summit communiqué, which stated that NATO is an alliance of ‘values’.36 This 
emphasis highlights one of Moscow’s principal concerns regarding NATO and enlargement, 
in addition to the presence of NATO military structures near its borders: its suspicion of the 
creeping influence of western norms and values within its ‘zone of privileged interest’. The 
Kremlin became increasingly uneasy about growing US (and European) influence in areas 
traditionally perceived as Russia’s ‘strategic backyard’, that is, in states such as Georgia and 
Ukraine, and the so-called ‘colour revolutions’ of the 2000s were viewed as an attempt to 
undermine Russia. This concern is reflected in key Russian strategic documents, discussed 
below. Although the alliance continues to stress that its door remains open to any European 
country ‘in a position to undertake the commitments and obligations of membership, and 
contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area’,37 there are signs that Russia may hold a de 
facto veto power on future members of the alliance, in particular those in the post-Soviet 
space. Potential membership of the alliance for states such as Georgia and Ukraine has 
proved to be a divisive issue, opening up rifts both between member states and between 
NATO and Russia. 
Enlarging into the post-Soviet space 
The persistent lack of consensus within NATO about future enlargement was demonstrated 
most clearly by the question of possible future accession for Georgia and Ukraine, which 
drove a wedge between the European and US pillars of the alliance at the Bucharest summit 
in 2008. The United States was a keen advocate of Georgia’s NATO membership, while 
certain European states were more reluctant. Speaking in Tbilisi in 2007, US Assistant 
Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Daniel Fried declared that not only was 
Georgia ‘in Europe’ in geographical, cultural, political and historical terms, but that it was 
part of the Euro-Atlantic community: ‘Georgians are a part of the transatlantic world, and 
therefore institutions of the transatlantic world should be open to Georgia as much as to any 
                                                          
36 Warsaw summit communiqué. 
37 NATO, ‘Enlargement’ , http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm. According 
to NATO, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has been assured that it will be 
invited to become a member as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the issue over the 
country’s name has been reached with Greece. Bosnia and Herzegovina was invited to 
conclude a MAP in April 2010, but its participation is pending the resolution of a key issue 
concerning immovable defence property. 
other European country.’38 This belief was not shared by all European allies—a disparity of 
views that recalled, to some extent, the situation in the 1950s over Turkey’s application for 
NATO membership. While Washington lobbied strongly for Georgian accession, there were 
doubts among some west European allies about the country’s ability to contribute to security 
in the transatlantic area. The friction highlighted questions about the fundamental nature of 
the alliance and the potential limits to enlargement, in spite of Article 10 and the ‘open door’ 
policy. France and Germany led the opposition (which included Italy and Spain) to Georgia 
and Ukraine being offered MAPs at the summit, arguing that the alliance should be focusing 
its efforts on existing operations in Afghanistan rather than enlarging still further. There was 
also concern—raised by the 1995 study on enlargement—that the addition of new members 
would transform the alliance from one concerned primarily with military matters to one 
concerned more with political issues, akin to the EU. Ultimately, a final decision on MAPs 
was deferred, although the summit’s final statement did stress that Georgia and Ukraine ‘will 
become members of NATO’ at some undefined point in the future.39 This confused message 
emphasized the lack of alliance consensus and encouraged Moscow to increase its pressure 
on Georgia (and across the post-Soviet space): thus, western procrastination since 2008 has 
not just failed to deter Russia’s coercive efforts, it has encouraged them. Georgia’s brief war 
with Russia in August 2008 appeared to confirm European fears about further enlargement of 
the alliance. It also acted as a warning shot to other post-Soviet states, such as Ukraine, and to 
the West, that Russia would not stand by and let countries in what it considers to be its 
strategic sphere of influence integrate more closely with western security institutions.  
In 2013 the former NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh-Rasmussen insisted that the 
alliance stood by the decisions taken at the Bucharest summit and would ‘continue to support 
the Georgian people in fulfilling their aspiration for NATO membership’.40 Unfortunately, 
ambiguous assurances about membership at ‘some point in the future’ ultimately serve to 
                                                          
38 Daniel Fried, ‘Developing Europe’s east’, remarks at conference in Tbilisi, Georgia, 1 Nov. 
2007, https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/94553.htm. 
39 Bucharest summit declaration issued by the heads of state and government participating in 
the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest, 3 April 2008, 
www.summitbucharest.ro/en/doc_201.html.  
40 ‘Information on the recent NATO–Georgia Commission meeting’, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Georgia, 4 Dec. 2013, 
http://geneva.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=905&info_id=2  
undermine the alliance’s aim of advancing stability on its periphery. Russia’s military 
intervention in Georgia in August 2008 exposed the limits of NATO’s influence and 
willingness to engage with states that Moscow considers to be within its ‘zone of privileged 
interest’, as well as its lack of internal unity vis-à-vis relations with Moscow and the question 
of future NATO engagement with states in the post-Soviet space. There is still no consensus 
within the alliance on whether Georgia should be offered a MAP, which works to Moscow’s 
advantage, signalling vulnerabilities that can be (and have been) exploited. The tensions over 
Georgia and Ukraine have not only further damaged NATO’s fragile cohesion, but also 
highlighted the divergence between the European and US approaches.41 This division could 
be exacerbated by Trump’s accession to the US presidency: not only has he questioned 
Article 5 and whether the United States should continue to support the notion of collective 
defence for allies that fail to meet their spending commitments, he is also keen to reset 
relations with Moscow. European member states are more likely to be directly affected by the 
negative impact of any decision to enlarge, as they are far more dependent upon Russia, 
particularly in terms of energy supplies. There is concern that, contrary to aims of the 
alliance, accession for states in the post-Soviet space will actually undermine security in the 
Euro-Atlantic area rather than strengthen it. 
Georgian dreams 
While enlargement may no longer be a pressing issue for western allies, many of which are 
distracted by internal challenges, the pursuit of NATO membership is still a key concern for 
the governments of Georgia and Ukraine. For Georgia, indeed, it has been a principal (and 
consistent) focus of foreign and security policy thinking for nearly two decades. 
The country’s 2011 National Security Strategy asserts that membership would ‘create solid 
guarantees for the nation’s security and stability and play an important role in strengthening 
stability in the entire region’.42 Georgia was the first country in the South Caucasus to state 
its desire to join the NATO alliance, expressing its membership aspirations in 2000 and 
registering them officially at the Prague summit held in November 2002—although it has 
participated in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme since 1994. The conclusion of an 
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Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) in October 2004 signalled the beginning of a 
closer relationship with NATO, which was deepened in 2006 with the alliance’s decision to 
commence ‘intensified dialogue’ with Tbilisi because of the considerable progress that had 
been made in the implementation of the IPAP. This move was viewed by Georgia as a 
‘significant step from partnership to membership candidate format’.43 The IPAP was 
superseded by the development of an Annual National Programme in late 2008, following the 
establishment of the NATO–Georgia Commission in the wake of the 2008 war with Russia. 
A NATO liaison office was opened in Tbilisi in 2010, the same year that the Sachkhere 
Mountain Training School became a NATO/PfP Mountain Training and Education Centre. In 
addition to these formal steps to establish a framework for partnership with NATO, Georgia 
has also made considerable progress in the reform of its armed forces, transforming itself 
from a consumer of security to a provider. Two milestones were reached in 2012: Georgia 
was included on the list of NATO aspirant members at the Chicago summit; and it became 
the largest non-NATO contributor (and fifth largest contributor overall) to the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the NATO-led operation in Afghanistan, which it had been 
supporting since 2004. Since deploying its first peacekeeping platoon in the Balkans in 1999, 
Georgia has dramatically increased the number of its troops participating in international 
peacekeeping and stabilization missions. The Georgian government has continued to support 
the development of the Afghan security forces since 2014, providing over 800 troops for 
Operation Resolute Support,44 and has also pledged financial support for the future 
development of the Afghan national security forces. Georgia also supports Operation Active 
Endeavour, NATO’s counterterrorist maritime surveillance operation in the Mediterranean, 
and contributed to the NATO Response Force (NRF) in 2015.  
Although Georgia was not offered a MAP at the 2014 NATO summit, the alliance did 
endorse the Substantial NATO–Georgia Package (SNGP), which includes defence capacity-
building, training, exercises, strengthened liaison and enhanced interoperability opportunities. 
Noting Georgia’s ‘significant efforts to strengthen its democracy and to modernise its 
military forces and defence institutions’, the summit declaration stated that the measures were 
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intended to strengthen Georgia’s defence and interoperability capabilities with NATO in 
order to help it ‘advance in its preparations towards membership’.45 While the intentions 
behind these efforts to bolster cooperation are good, the SNGP is flawed as it is not supported 
with specific resources from the alliance, only advisers and individual voluntary contributions 
from member states. Thus, NATO appears to be paying lip-service to deepening its 
engagement with Georgia, rather than taking properly supported steps towards it. 
NATO’s apparent ambivalence towards membership for Georgia contrasts sharply with 
popular support for it in the South Caucasus state itself. There is very little opposition to the 
government’s western alignment, and referendums on the issue of NATO membership 
demonstrate consistently high levels of support for accession, even among opposition groups. 
The majority of the population support closer ties with both the United States and the Euro-
Atlantic community, revealing the depth of concern there is about the Russian ‘threat’, 
although support has been eroded by the 2008 conflict, as well as the lack of progress 
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towards alliance membership. According to a survey conducted in June 2016, support for the 
country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations has remained stable, with 64 per cent of those questioned 
agreeing with the government’s stated goal of joining NATO (down from 65 per cent in May 
2015; support for integration into the EU is higher at 72 per cent). A majority of those polled 
(53 per cent) believe that the country will benefit from closer integration with western 
institutions such as NATO, although 29 per cent support abandoning integration to pursue 
closer ties with Russia.46 This reflects an emerging sense of disillusionment and ‘NATO 
fatigue’, resulting from the lack of visible progress towards membership and the failure to 
move beyond apparently vague and empty promises, detracting from the credibility of the 
alliance in the country. The pursuit of membership and enhanced cooperation with NATO has 
left Georgia in a very uncomfortable position of partnership, including front-line 
contributions in Afghanistan and elsewhere, along with a visible NATO presence in the 
country, without the security guarantees that accompany membership, making it more 
susceptible to increased pressure from Moscow. Continued procrastination on the part of the 
western allies is seen as signalling a tacit acceptance of Russia’s coercive actions across the 
post-Soviet space and, although Georgian officials talk of the need for ‘strategic patience’ 
vis-à-vis the country’s desire to join the alliance, they also stress that this patience is not 
infinite.  
Ukrainian uncertainty 
Despite some similarities in their post-Soviet experience, notably the occurrence of a ‘colour 
revolution’ and continued pressure from Moscow regarding strategic orientation, Ukraine and 
Georgia have followed very different paths. Whereas Georgia’s desire for integration into the 
Euro-Atlantic community has remained unchanged for over a decade, since 1991 Ukrainian 
foreign policy has been characterized by inconsistency, stemming from a failure to address 
the question of whether it should look eastwards or westwards. Despite a declared 
‘multivectored’ foreign policy, the country’s strategic orientation has oscillated between 
pursuit of integration into NATO and the EU, non-alignment, and closer ties with Moscow, 
depending on the interests and inclinations of successive incumbent presidents. These swings 
were clearly demonstrated during the 2010 elections, which brought Viktor Yanukovych to 
power on a platform of rejecting Ukraine’s ambitions for NATO membership and highlighted 
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deep political divisions across the country.47 Yanukovych’s foreign policy priorities, which 
included restoring Ukraine’s close ties with Russia alongside integration into European and 
Euro-Atlantic structures, were in stark contrast to his predecessor’s unambiguously pro-
western stance. In June 2010 the Ukrainian parliament ratified a bill that prohibited 
membership of any military bloc and reinforced the country’s non-aligned status.48 
Nevertheless, it did allow for cooperation with alliances such as NATO.  
Ukraine joined the PfP programme in 1994, and three years later it agreed a Charter on 
Distinctive Partnership which led to the establishment of the NATO–Ukraine Commission.49 
It has deployed troops in NATO operations, including peace support operations in the 
Balkans (indeed, it continues to contribute to the force in Kosovo), ISAF, the training mission 
in Iraq and Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean. In addition to being the only 
partner country that has contributed to all current NATO-led operations and missions, it is 
also the first partner country to have contributed to the NRF.50 Nevertheless, despite this 
cooperation, there remained a lingering suspicion of the alliance in Ukraine, particularly 
among senior ranks in the military. This shifted with Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the 
continuing crisis in eastern Ukraine, which prompted a renewed push for closer relations with 
NATO. At the 2014 Wales summit, it was announced that five trust funds were to be 
established in critical areas of reform to enhance Ukrainian defence and security: these 
covered command, control, communications and computers (C4); logistics and 
standardization; cyber defence; military career transition and medical rehabilitation. The trust 
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fund format allowed member states and partners to provide financial support for specific 
areas on a voluntary basis, in much the same way as the SNGP with Georgia described 
above.51 The alliance has been uncompromising in its description of Russia’s ‘aggressive 
actions’ in and around Ukraine, including the ‘ongoing illegal and illegitimate annexation of 
Crimea’, ‘the violation of sovereign borders by force’, ‘the deliberate destabilisation of 
eastern Ukraine’, ‘provocative military activities near NATO’s borders’ and ‘irresponsible 
and aggressive nuclear rhetoric’.52 In 2016 NATO increased its support for Ukraine with the 
initiation of a comprehensive package of assistance intended to assist the latter with the 
strengthening of its defences at a time of persistent instability in the east of the country. 
However, as noted above, it is this very ongoing conflict that prevents Ukraine from meeting 
the criteria for membership outlined in the 1995 study on enlargement and therefore hinders 
closer ties with the alliance.  
Unlike its counterpart in Georgia, the Ukrainian public is divided on the issue of closer ties 
with the West, particularly NATO, reflecting the political rifts in the country. However, 
opinion has been shifting as the conflict in the east of the country continues, and there are 
signs of increasingly support for closer ties with NATO. A survey conducted during April 
and May 2015 found that 40 per cent of those polled wanted Ukraine to become a member of 
NATO by 2020, but only 28 per cent believed this might happen. There was greater support 
for Ukraine’s integration into the EU (55 per cent wanted this to happen, but only 40 per cent 
believed it would), while only 13 per cent believed that the country should become part of the 
Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union.53 
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The inconsistencies in Ukraine’s relationship with NATO, at both the state and the popular 
level, makes alliance ambivalence towards closer integration more understandable than in the 
case of Georgia. Nevertheless, the western aspirations of both countries have brought them 
into conflict with Moscow, which has repeatedly expressed its opposition to the enlargement 
of NATO, as well as what is perceived to be increasing western influence within the post-
Soviet space. NATO’s current approach towards enlargement and closer partnership with 
both Georgia and Ukraine has increased their exposure to Russian threats and pressure, an 
outcome that was anticipated by the scholarly literature of the 1990s, outlined above. The 
alliance has consistently overlooked (or disregarded) the declared position of the Russian 
leadership vis-à-vis further enlargement.  
Russian roadblock 
The post-Soviet Euro-Atlantic paths of Georgia and Ukraine may be dissimilar, but both 
countries face Russian hostility to closer ties and integration with the alliance: Moscow’s 
antipathy towards Georgian and/or Ukrainian membership of NATO and indeed towards any 
further enlargement of the alliance continues to act as a roadblock to accession. Enlargement 
has been a persistent irritant for Moscow since the end of the Cold War, reflected in 
statements from Yeltsin’s 1995 warning that further enlargement would mean a 
‘conflagration of war throughout Europe’ to the 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS), 
discussed below.54 Russia’s then Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov outlined the country’s 
view in 1996 in a statement that, with hindsight, sounds a warning: 
<ext>We do not want the old bloc divisions to be replaced with new ones that would divide 
the world into two parts. That is why Russia is against NATO expansion . . . We have taken a 
negative position on this and we will stick to it. Of course, this does not mean that we can 
veto new admissions . . . But we have the right to protect our national interests, and if NATO 
advances to our territory, we will take adequate measures in terms of military construction 
and will try to remedy the geo-political situation.55<extend> 
Enlargement was perceived to be aimed at checking Russia’s foreign and domestic ambitions 
and excluding it from any future European security order. NATO’s global reach and 
                                                          
54 Steven Erlanger, ‘In a new attack against NATO, Yeltsin talks of a “conflagration of war”’, 
New York Times, 9 Sept. 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/09/world/in-a-new-attack-
against-nato-yeltsin-talks-of-a-conflagration-of-war.html.  
55 Quoted in J. L. Black, Russia faces NATO expansion: bearing gifts or bearing arms? 
(Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), p. 21. 
enlargement have been consistently criticized by Moscow in formal policy documents since 
the accession of the three Baltic states in 2004, which brought the alliance into the post-
Soviet space and up to the borders of Russian territory. The 2009 NSS stated that ‘plans to 
extend the alliance's military infrastructure to Russia's borders, and attempts to endow NATO 
with global functions that go counter to norms of international law, are unacceptable to 
Russia’.56 The 2013 Foreign Policy Concept echoed this antagonistic attitude towards NATO 
enlargement, describing the presence of the alliance’s military infrastructure near Russia’s 
borders as violating the principle of equal security and contributing to the emergence of ‘new 
dividing lines in Europe’.57 NATO’s enhanced capabilities, global scope and enlargement 
were identified as the principal risk to Russian national security in the 2014 military doctrine, 
while the updated NSS, published in 2015, makes several references to NATO’s global reach 
and interests, its ‘violation’ of international norms, further enlargement and the advance of its 
military infrastructure towards Russia’s borders—all of which are considered as threats to 
Russian national security.58 
NATO enlargement has contributed to Russia’s perception—buttressed by the alliance’s 
action against Serbia in 1999—that the alliance is an offensive military organisation that is 
seeking to undermine the Russian regime and its system of values, and is prepared to interfere 
in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state. Moscow’s reaction to the 2008 Bucharest summit 
and its subsequent military intervention in Georgia surprised many within the international 
community, including NATO, and reinforced growing concerns about an increasingly 
assertive Russia that would take all possible steps to maintain its traditional ‘sphere of 
influence’. Until then, there had been an assumption that Russian expressions of unease about 
enlargement were merely rhetorical, leading to disregard of warnings such as that uttered in 
March 2008 by Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov that there would be a ‘substantial 
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negative geopolitical shift’ if either Georgia or Ukraine became a NATO member state.59 
Eight years later, in July 2016, this warning was echoed by Russia’s permanent envoy to 
NATO, Alexander Grushko, who accused NATO of seeking to impose new dividing lines on 
Europe and cautioned that Russia would do everything to ensure its defence and that NATO’s 
eastwards expansion would be counterproductive, as it subjected Russia to ‘risks and 
threats’.60 Unfortunately, the alliance has consistently overlooked (or disregarded) the 
declared position of the Russian leadership vis-à-vis further enlargement, thereby triggering 
the very renewed divisions between East and West that it has sought to avoid. 
Conclusions 
The 1967 Harmel Report did not consider the issue of possible NATO enlargement. 
However, 50 years after the report was published, the question of enlargement threatens to 
undermine the twin pillars of deterrence and dialogue identified in the report. NATO needs a 
much clearer position on the issue of future enlargement, both to send a message to states on 
the aspirant list and to demonstrate unity of purpose in the face of Russian efforts to 
undermine alliance solidarity. While Article 10 does offer a clear exit for the alliance in terms 
of declining membership for countries such as Georgia, the alliance still needs to be thinking 
long-term, in terms of both the future of enlargement and the future of the alliance itself. 
NATO’s desire to keep the possibility of membership open to any state that meets the 
requirements of Article 10 has not only undermined Euro-Atlantic security and triggered new 
divisions between East and West, it has also exposed aspirant states, particularly those in the 
post-Soviet space, to sustained pressure and coercion from Moscow. There is an inherent 
tension between Article 5 and Article 10, between collective defence and the alliance’s open 
door policy, and it has become clear that it will be very difficult for NATO to ensure the 
security of its member states while simultaneously developing partnerships and discussions 
about future membership with states on the periphery, particularly those in Russia’s ‘zone of 
privileged interest’. The alliance’s open door policy appears to be undermining both its own 
security and the security of aspirant states, an effect that runs counter to the original 
objectives of enlargement. Vague promises about membership at ‘some point in the future’ 
ultimately undermine the alliance’s objective of fostering stability on its periphery. 
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While both Georgia and Ukraine continue to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security by 
deploying troops on NATO operations and missions, and make an important contribution to 
the alliance’s efforts to advance cooperative security, ultimately the issue of their prospective 
membership threatens to undermine alliance security and cohesion. With Russia taking an 
increasingly assertive stance on the global stage and uncertainty surrounding the direction of 
US foreign policy under President Trump, the issue of NATO enlargement is unlikely to be a 
priority for the alliance over the next few years. If NATO ultimately rejects any prospect of 
membership for states in the post-Soviet space, they could be abandoned to Russian 
influence, indicating that Moscow has a de facto veto over membership of the alliance and 
conceding a ‘sphere of influence’ to Russia. The alternative is that NATO offers these 
countries a form of intensified partnership, but no prospect of membership. Such an approach 
is likely to have a very negative impact on those aspirant states who find themselves 
‘excluded’ from the alliance, left on the outside and caught between NATO and Russia. 
There is the risk that such an approach will exacerbate existing divisions between East and 
West, leaving states such as Georgia and Ukraine caught between western and Russian 
‘spheres of influence’ and therefore vulnerable to pressure. It could also undermine reformers 
in these countries, as well as popular support for difficult liberal democratic and economic 
reforms. 
NATO enlargement during the post-Cold War era has been driven, to a large extent, by those 
outside the alliance seeking to join. Internally, the process has been driven predominantly by 
the United States, which has offered strong support for the membership bids of countries 
across central and eastern Europe, as well as those in the post-Soviet space. This is likely to 
change under a Trump presidency. Not only has Trump questioned Article 5 and whether the 
United States should continue to support the notion of collective defence for allies that fail to 
meet their spending commitments, he is also keen to reset relations with Moscow. The United 
States has traditionally been one of the principal advocates of alliance membership for 
Georgia (and Ukraine), but there is unlikely now to be any appetite for enlargement into post-
Soviet space, or any desire to further provoke Moscow. This will surely mean that 
Washington steps back from providing visible backing for the accession bids of Georgia and 
Ukraine, which will likely find their bids for membership ‘parked’ by NATO. However, 
although enlargement of the Euro-Atlantic alliance is unlikely to be a pressing issue for the 
foreseeable future for the western allies, many of which are distracted by internal challenges, 
membership remains a central objective of both the Georgian and Ukrainian governments. 
This means that the issue will be kept alive and will continue to undermine both intra-alliance 
relations and those between NATO and Russia. 
Enlargement has been a persistent irritant for Moscow since the end of the Cold War, and 
potential membership of the alliance for states such as Georgia and Ukraine has proved to be 
a persistent cause of division, both between member states and between the alliance and 
Moscow. Georgia and Ukraine may have taken different paths in their approach to the Euro-
Atlantic area in the post-Soviet era, but both face a Russian roadblock in the form of 
Moscow’s hostility to their forging closer ties with the alliance. Both states currently fall foul 
of the accession criteria regarding the resolution of territorial disputes prior to membership, 
and all three of the unresolved conflicts (in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and eastern Ukraine) are 
tacitly supported by Moscow. Consequently, while the Warsaw summit communiqué 
indicated the alliance’s intention to focus on boosting the securing of the wider Black Sea 
region, the accession of either Georgia or Ukraine remains a distant dream. 
